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I. Introduction 
Refugees enjoy a distinct and unique standard of protection under international law 
within the framework of the international regime for the protection of refugees, which is 
based on the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees.
1
 There are about 16.7 
million refugees worldwide.
2
 11.7 of those refugees are under the protection of the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees [hereinafter UNHCR] and the 
remaining 5 million are registered with the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for 
Palestine [hereinafter UNRWA].
3
 
United Nations [hereinafter UN] began rewriting international refugee law in 
1948. There was serious awareness of the problems of refugees post World War II and 
that attention was a dire necessity. Currently several UN entities as well as multilateral 
treaties tackle refugee matters directly. International refugee law is the backbone of 
refugee matters, while the UNHCR
4
 is its executing body. The 1951 Refugee 
Convention
5
 and its protocol in 1967
6
 both set out the definition of who is and who is not 
a refugee. Both treaties also determine the rights refugees have in host states. This is in 
addition to UNRWA,
7
 which dedicates its efforts solely to address Palestinian refugee 
matters. 
According to the 1951 Refugee Convention, a refugee is a person, who is: 
Owing to well founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside 
the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to 
avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality 
                                                          
1
 Marı´a-Teresa Gil-Bazo, Refugee Protection under International Human Rights Law: From Non-
Refoulement to Residence and Citizenship, Refugee Survey Quarterly, 2015, 1–32. 
2
 UNHCR, World Refugee Day: Global forced displacement tops 50 million for first time in post-World War 
II era, June 14, 2014. http://www.unhcr.org/53a155bc6.html. 
3
 Id. 
4
 UN General Assembly, Refugees and stateless persons. Dec. 3, 1949, A/RES/319. 
5
 UN General Assembly, Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, United Nations, 
Treaty Series, vol. 189, p. 137. 
6
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7
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and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such 
events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.
8
 
The importance of the 1951 Refugee Convention lies in its power to grant 
refugees asylum. Yet, the 1951 Refugee Convention is also keen on providing other 
benefits as assistance and aid, as well as to grant them protection and a process towards a 
durable solution to their dilemma: 
The Refugee Convention constitutes a continuation of the legal regime for the 
protection of refugees established in international law in the early 20th century 
and it predates the establishment of the international regime for the protection of 
human rights born in the United Nations (UN) era. While the forced movement of 
persons across borders and the granting of asylum to those fleeing persecution are 
historical constants, refugee protection only became a matter of international law 
after the First World.9 
 Stemming from the definition of refugees based on the 1951 Refugee 
Convention, awarding asylum to refugees is their first guarantee to protection and safety. 
While there is not a specific definition of the term “protection” for refugees, it is evident 
that protection awarded to refugees is mirrored by host states’ fulfillment of the benefits 
and standards of protection articles stated in the 1951 Refugee Convention.
10
  
Within the many refugee groups in the world, the Palestinian refugees’ dilemma 
is the most prolonged, unresolved refugee issue in the world; their plight has been going 
on for over 67 years.
11
 Although Palestinian refugees are a recognized group of refugees 
by UN, the 1951 Refugee Convention has excluded them from its mandate,
12
 as well as 
UNHCR.
13
 
The issue of Palestinian refugees is one of the most debated refugee matters of all 
time. Since their first exodus in 1948, Palestinian refugees have not only been denied 
                                                          
8
 UN General Assembly, supra note 5. 
9
 Gil-Bazo, supra note 1. 
10
 The benefits and protection measures awarded to refugees will be covered in Ch. 4 of this paper. 
11
 Since the end of the end of British Mandate Palestine and the division of the state to two states; a 
Jewish and an Arab one in 1948. 
12
 Article 1D of the 1951 Refugee Convention will be elaborately tackled in chapter 3 of this paper. 
13
 Article 7(c) of the UNHCR Mandate will be covered in Chapter 3 of this paper. 
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their right to return to their state of origin,
14
 but they are also victimized by international 
refugee law, as well as host states.
15
 While the Palestinian refugee dilemma has a political 
side, there are several other angles to their problem, such as the right to return, preserving 
their human rights as a distinct group of refugees, in addition to granting them the right to 
a durable solution based on both international customary and convention based law. As 
Susan Akram aptly states: 
The Palestinian refugee problem is one of the longest-lasting refugee crises in the 
world without a real solution in sight. Although at its core a political problem, the 
Palestinian refugee crisis is also a problem of legal distortion: Palestinian refugees 
fall into a legal lacuna that sets them outside minimal international protections 
available for all other refugee group in the world.
16
 
This paper argues that Palestinian refugees fall into a protection gap based on the 
framework of international law they are subjected to. Since the beginning of the Nakbah 
in 1948, Palestinian refugees have been victimized by several factors that have assisted in 
prolonging of their plight. First, the international community embodied by UN for not 
reaching a durable solution for Palestinian refugees or seeking redress for their situation. 
Second, host states attitude towards Palestinian refugees. And third, the highly politicized 
nature of the Palestinian refugee problem has rendered redress almost impossible. This 
protection gap is more evident in the plight of Palestinian refugees fleeing from Syria 
since 2011. If there were a framework that guaranteed rights and granted protection to 
Palestinian refugees, then their plight would not have continued as they go through their 
second or third displacement.  
Chapter two introduces Palestinian refugee matters in relation to UN. The chapter 
will introduce which UN bodies are responsible for assisting Palestinian refugees and 
discuss their accomplishment and how effective UN assistance has been for the past 67 
years. The two main bodies that were dedicated to responding to Palestinian refugee 
matters are United Nations Conciliation Commission, created in 1948 and aimed at 
                                                          
14
 LEX TEKKENBERG, PALESTINIAN REFUGEES AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, (Oxford University Press Inc. 1998) 1998. 
15
 For the intent and purpose of this paper, the hosting states that are covered are Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, 
Egypt, as well as Turkey. 
16
 Susan M. Akram, Palestinian Refugees and their Legal Status: Rights, Politics, and Implications for a Just 
Solution, 31 JPS 36, 36 (2002). 
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mediating between Arabs and Israelis post the Nakbah war in 1948 that caused the first 
Palestinian exodus. UNRWA on the hand has offered aid and assistance to Palestinian 
refugees only, this unique situation made UNRWA stand out as it was dedicated to one 
group of refugees only. 
Chapter three tackles the relationship between Palestinian refugees and 
international law through examining Article 1D or the 1951 Refugee Convention, which 
excludes Palestinian refugees from the convention. As well as Article 7c of the UNHCR 
mandate. Both articles see, to exclude Palestinian refugees from the benefiting from the 
convention. 
Chapter four defines what is referred to in literature as the protection gap. 
Secondly, it discusses refugee assistance as a privilege of the host states as well as 
concerned international institutions and not a duty towards refugees and its implications 
on assistance and aid granted to refugees. The chapter next answers the question of how 
refugees fall into a protection gap via discussing the way the 1951 Refugee Convention 
was first drafted de jure and how these laws are being manifested in aid and assistance de 
facto granted to refugees by host states. 
Chapter five tackles Palestinian refugees from Syria directly, via examining their 
situation in both Prior to the Syrian civil war as well as their situation post the conflict in 
Syria in 2011.The chapter will also introduce the Palestinian refugees from Syria post the 
Syrian Civil War in 2011. The chapter will also highlight the way Palestinian refugees 
from Syria are treated by the Arab host states that are neighboring Syria, the chapter 
examines Palestinian refugees’ situation in Jordan, Lebanon, Egypt, as well as Turkey 
and their reaction to the recent mass influx of Palestinian refugees into their states. The 
chapter also highlights host states’ treatment of Palestinian refugees fleeing from Syria. 
The chapter concludes with recommending Temporary Protection Status as a solution for 
the Palestinian refugees from Syria. 
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II. United Nations and Palestinian Refugees 
UN is concerned with matters relevant to finding solutions to Palestinian refugees and 
eventually finding a resolution to their limbo status. A contentious matter which only 
became more intricate as years of the Palestinian problem prolonged with no durable 
solution to be reached. Sixty seven years passed since the beginning of the Palestinian 
plight in 1948, and hundreds of UN resolutions were issued that tackle the Palestinian 
refugee matters in specific, as well as the question of Palestine in general. 
This chapter introduces UN bodies that are dedicated to Palestinian refugee 
matters and how these UN bodies reacted to the plight of Palestinian refugees throughout 
the years, and finally, what each UN body contributed to help assist Palestinian refugees. 
Initially, there was United Nations Disaster Relief Project
17
 [hereinafter UNDPR] which 
was a short term project, then came along United Nations Conciliation Commission for 
Palestine [hereinafter UNCCP], and finally the United Nations Relief and Works Agency 
for Palestine Refugees in the Near East [hereinafter UNRWA]. Each of these bodies will 
be argued and analyzed, and introduce the impact they had on Palestinian refugees lives. 
UN’s first attempt to aid Palestinian refugees was the creation of UNDPR, a short 
term project of six days initiated in July 1948, which mainly aimed at initiating an 
emergency like aid to the Palestinian refugees that were gravely effected by the aftermath 
of the war in 1948. The UNDPR “proved substantially ineffective, given the lack of any 
major contributions from the wealthier Western states, and the lack of effective 
organization and generosity by most of the Arab states.”18 The fiasco attempt of finding a 
solution for the Palestinian refugee matter fell into the chasm of lack of cooperation, 
interest, and investment on behalf of the foreign states as well as the Arab ones. Hence, 
UN resorted in finding an alternative entity to oversee Palestinian refugee rights. 
 
                                                          
17
 The UNDPR was created due to woks of Count Folke Bernadotte, who held the position of the United 
Nations Mediator for Palestine. Based on a UNGA Res. 186 (S-2), on May 14, 1948. His work included 
submitting progress reports, among his many recommendations, Bernadotte affirmed the right to return. 
18
 Benny Morris, The Initial Absorption of the Palestinian Refugees in the Arab Host Countries 1948-49, in 
REFUGEES IN THE AGE OF TOTAL WAR, (Anna Bramwell ed., 1989). 
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A. UNCCP 
Subsequently, UN General Assembly set up the UNCCP in its resolution 194
19
. The 
significance of the resolution manifests in paragraph 11, which sets out the mandate for 
UNCCP. The new UN entity was to play a significant role in facilitating “repatriation, 
resettlement and economic and social rehabilitation of the refugees and the payment of 
compensation.”20 Originally, the newly formed state of Israel had approved on the right 
to return to about 100,000 Palestinian refugees. “The government of Israel would be 
prepared to accept the return to Israel in its present limits of 100,000 refugees.”21 Israel 
soon after rebutted its own statement and rejected the idea all together. The Israeli 
position caused dissatisfaction to the Arab states and it was evident that if negotiations 
were to continue in such a manner, then the Palestinian refugee issue will remain 
unattended inevitably.  
This eventually meant that the UNCCP was not successful in fulfilling its 
mandate. All its future endeavors were met with Israeli opposition and Arab states’ 
disapproval, Israel was “content to maintain the no-war, no-peace status quo,”22 which 
meant that Palestinian refugees were to remain unprotected, without a durable solution, 
and at the mercy of the cooperation of Arab host states. Therefore, a different UN body 
was necessary to take care for the day-to-day necessities to assist Palestinian refugees 
until a permanent solution was found for Palestinian refugees. 
B. UNRWA 
UNRWA was established in 1948 pursuant to United Nations General Assembly 
[hereinafter UNGA] Res. 302 (IV.)
23
 UNRWA stands uniquely in international law for 
three reasons. Firstly, the UNRWA is the only agency under UN that is dedicated to the 
                                                          
19
 G.A. Res. 194 (III), UN. Doc. A/RES/194 (III) (Dec. 11, 1948).  
20
 Id. Para 11. 
21
 UNCCP Historical Survey of Efforts of the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine to 
secure the Implementation of paragraph 11 of General Assembly resolution 194 (III), U.N. Doc. 
A/AC.25/W/82/Rev.1 (Oct. 2, 1961). 
22
 Benjamin Schiff, Between occupier and occupied: UNRWA in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, 18 JPS 
60, 60-75 (1989). 
23
 G.A. Res. 302 (IV), UN. Doc. A/RES/302 (IV) (Dec. 8, 1949). 
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assistance and relief of one group of refugees solely. Secondly, UNRWA’s mandate is 
directed towards providing relief and a works program to Palestinian refugees, and not to 
promote a permanent solution for Palestinian refugees or provide protection to them in 
contrast to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees [hereinafter 
UNHCR] mandate that aims at promoting protection of refugees. Finally, the UN did not 
aim to define the term ‘Palestine refugee’ when creating the UNRWA and left this matter 
in the hands of UNRWA itself. UNRWA created three different definitions of the term 
‘Palestine refugee’24 until it came up with the definition that is still used until today in 
1993, “Any person whose normal place of residence was Palestine during the period 1 
June 1946 to 15 May 1948 and who lost both home and means of livelihood as a result of 
the 1948 conflict.”25 UNRWA’s direct mandate is set out to provide “direct relief and 
works programs [to] prevent conditions of starvation and distress and to further 
conditions of peace and stability.”26 
Many Arab states felt that creating a UN agency acting in benefit of the 
Palestinian refugees was not in a sense a privilege to Palestinian refugees but instead, it 
was a right. Several Arab states believed that the UN shouldered a huge burden for the 
Palestinians displacement and the creation of the Palestinian refugee problem in the first 
place. UNGA Res. 181 (II),
27
 also known as, the ‘Partition Plan’ divided Mandate 
Palestine into two separate states: an Arab state and a Jewish state. “The plan was not 
accepted, however, by the Arab population of Palestine and the Arab states on the 
grounds that it violated the provisions of the United Nations Charter, which granted 
people the right to decide their own destiny.”28 
                                                          
24
 The first of the Palestine refugee definition appeared in the Addendum to Definition of a "Refugee" 
Under paragraph 11 of the General Assembly Resolution of 11 December 1948. A/AC.25/W/61/Add.1 
(May 29, 1951). The second definition appeared in the UNRWA Operational Instruction No. 104 (Feb 18, 
1952). And the final definition of the Palestine refugee appeared in the Consolidated Registration and 
Eligibility Instructions (CRI) (Jan. 1, 1993) Para 2.13. 
25
 UNRWA, Consolidated Registration and Eligibility Instructions (CRI) (Jan. 1, 1993) Para 2.13. 
26
 Id. 
27
 G.A. Res. 181(II), U.N. Doc. A/RES/181(II) (Nov.29, 1947). UNGA res. 181 (II) had 13 votes against the 
resolution including Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Yemen, and Syria. See UN, Department of Public 
Information 1944, 5. 
28
 TEKKENBERG, Supra note 14, at 12.  
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Mr. Karim Azkoul of Lebanon voiced the Arab states’ concern in the General 
Assembly’s 358th meeting in its fifth session on November, 27, 1950 regarding the 
necessity of separating the Palestinian refugees from all their counterparts, and more 
elaborately, the light in which Arab states’ rationalized the source of the Palestinian 
refugee problem and the Palestine question generally: 
Palestinian refugees … differed from all other refugee. In all other cases, persons 
had become refugees as a result of action taken contrary to the principles of the 
United Nations and the obligation of the Organization toward them was a moral 
one only. The existence of Palestine refugees, on the other hand, was the direct 
result of a decision taken by the United Nations itself, with full knowledge of the 
consequences. The Palestine refugees were therefore a direct responsibility on the 
part of the United Nations and could not be placed in the general category of 
refugees without betrayal of that responsibility.
29
 
UNRWA was created to safeguard the Palestinian refugees’ right to receive aid. 
Yet the UN never clearly mentioned whether this aid and relief was a right or a privilege 
to the Palestinian refugees. The UNRWA was established to accomplish two main 
purposes: 
To carry out in collaboration with local governments the direct relief and works 
programs as recommended by the Economic Survey Mission; [and]  
to consult with the interested Near Eastern Governments concerning measures to 
be taken by them preparatory to the time when international assistance for relief 
and works projects is no longer available.
30
 
UNRWA has five areas of operations in the Middle East, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, 
the West Bank, and Gaza. Their operations cover “human development and humanitarian 
services [that] encompass primary and vocational education, primary health care, relief 
and social services, infrastructure and camp improvement, microfinance and emergency 
response, including in situations of armed conflict.”31 UNRWA considers itself as “a 
major provider of public service,”32 indicating that the UNRWA aims mainly at 
providing temporary services for the Palestinian refugees in fields of education, health 
                                                          
29
 G.A.O.R., 5
th
 Sess., 3
rd
 comm., 328
th
 mtg., para 47. 
30
 Id. para 7. 
31
 UNRWA, What We Do, http://www.unrwa.org/what-we-do. 
32
 UNRWA, PROGRAM BUDGET 2014-2015, (2013), http://www.unrwa.org/sites/default/files/2014-
2015_programme_budget_blue_book.pdf. 
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care, and aid. It is neither in its capacity nor mandate to fully assist Palestinian refugees 
in integrating in Arab host states. UNRWA states that its main goals are “fostering the 
human development of Palestine refugees by helping them to acquire knowledge and 
skills, lead long and healthy lives, achieve decent standards of living, [and] enjoy human 
rights to the fullest possible extent.”33 
UNRWA is mainly concerned with the following functions. The first is education. 
UNRWA has around 700 schools and approximately 479,519 students learning within the 
UNRWA system.
34
 Second, UNRWA offers basic health services to about 3.1 million 
Palestinian refugees.
35
 Third, about 301,015 Palestinian refugees benefit from the relief 
and social services that are offered by the UNRWA by assisting the refugees in receiving 
social protection services and extending assistance to refugees living under hard 
conditions
36
 as well as basic food supplies. Next, the UNRWA assists in micro financing 
loans to generate income for some refugee families; around 344,493 loans have been 
granted.
37
 
UNRWA has also responded to Palestinian refugee needs in times of crises in an 
ad hoc manner. The Palestinian refugees have benefited from UN resolutions
38
 that give 
UNRWA leeway to limited protection measures in order to benefit Palestinian refugees. 
For example, during the 1967 War, UNRWA’s role was significantly more evident in 
protecting Palestinian refugees from hostilities.
39
 Similarly, the UNRWA also executed 
similar protection measures in the 1982 Sabra and Shatila massacre.
40
 In addition to its 
role during the first and second Intifada,
41
 the protection mandate was mainly 
                                                          
33
 G.A. UNRWA, What we Do, http://www.unrwa.org/what-we-do. 
34
 G.A. UNRWA, Human Development Goals, http://www.unrwa.org/who-we-are/human-development-
goals 
35
 Id. 
36
 Id. 
37
 Id. 
38
 The United Nations Security Council as well as the General Assembly have frequently addressed 
Palestinian crises with attention, yet most resolutions were not of binding nature and were considered as 
recommendations.  
39
 U.N.S.C Res. S/RES/242 (1967). 
40
 U.N.S.C Res. S/RES/521 (1982). As well as U.N.G.A. Res. A/RES/37/123. 
41
 U.N.S.C Res. S/RES/605 (1987) and S/RES/1322 (2000). 
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humanitarian assistance at times of necessity. An example of the limited protection 
mandate is the Goulding Report
42
 that recommended to the United Nations Security 
Council during the first Intifada the dire need to ensure Palestinian refugees the following 
“physical protection, legal protection, protection by the way of general assistance, and 
protection by publicity.”43 UNRWA sought to preserve the human rights of Palestinian 
refugees from the Israeli forces and advocate on behalf of Palestinian refugees from 
illegal and discriminatory practices against them. In addition to that, the UNRWA 
litigated on behalf of Palestinian refugees in cases of arbitrary detentions or arrests.
44
 
Most recently, the UNRWA also executed protection measures to about 456,000 
Palestinian refugees affected by the outbreak of the Syrian civil war in 2011.
45
 
It is evident that UNRWA’s mandate has evolved over the years and has managed 
to provide a form of protection to Palestinian refugees in dire times of need. Yet, as long 
as this protection is limited to necessity and has no set mandate or obligatory execution, 
all Palestinian refugees will continue to suffer in light of the current mandate that does 
not provide any form of protection to them. 
While all the functions of UNRWA follow human rights law in general, it has still 
failed to supply the Palestinian refugees with sustainable protection that guarantees their 
safety in the long run. This is the case of Palestinian refugees in Syria, who have been 
greatly affected by the civil war. The UNRWA has not been able to perform much in the 
face of host governments’ actions and protect them from ‘non-entry’ practices, or assist 
them in receiving aid that is mainly a right and not a privilege by host states. 
Without an amendment to the UNRWA’s mandate or the international 
community’s acknowledgement that the Palestinian refugees fall under the 1951 Refugee 
Convention and the UNHCR’s mandate, all efforts to grant Palestinian refugees 
protection will remain futile 
                                                          
42
 The Secretary-General, Report Submitted to the Security Council by the Secretary-General, in 
Accordance with Resolution 605 (1987), U.N. Doc. S/19443 (Jan. 21, 1988). 
43
 Id. para 28. 
44
 Id. 
45
 Id. 
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III. International Law and Palestinian Refugees 
 While Palestinian refugees benefit from a lot of UN resolutions that aim at easing their 
plight and minimizing their hardship inside the borders of Palestine and outside in Arab 
hosting states, the same cannot be said for the 1951 Refugee Convention that directly 
addresses refugee matters. It is argued that the 1951 Refugee Convention as well as 
UNHCR has ignored the presence of Palestinian refugees. This chapter discusses the 
international laws that have affected the Palestinian refugees’ situation in Arab host 
states. Firstly, the chapter discusses article 1(D) of the 1951 Refugee Conventions. 
Second, article 7 (c) of the UNHCR Statute that at its core mimics article 1(D) of the 
1951 Refugee Convention. 
A. ART. 1D of the 1951 Convention 
The first part of Article 1D of the 1951 Refugee Convention reads: “This Convention 
shall not apply to persons who are at present receiving from organs or agencies of the 
United Nations other than the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
protection or assistance.”46 This part of Article 1D is known as the ‘exclusion clause’ for 
Palestinian refugees. It excludes them from falling under the umbrella of the 1951 
Refugee Convention and the UNHCR’s mandate because they are already benefiting 
from the protection of the UNCCP,
47
 and the assistance of UNRWA. The special wording 
of this clause excludes Palestinian refugees from their refugee counterparts. Using the 
word or in the last phrase “protection or assistance”48 gives leeway to the 1951 Refugee 
Convention as well as the UNHCR to step aside and not act on behalf of Palestinian 
refugees. While the UNCCP was never responsible for protecting Palestinian refugees 
from rights such as non-refoulement or receiving aid and benefits as a right, it could be 
understood that the UNCCP was responsible for protecting their right to redress and a 
durable solution. Palestinian refugees are excluded from the convention on the grounds of 
receiving assistance from a solely dedicated entity, the UNRWA. Therefore, it is widely 
                                                          
46
 UN General Assembly, supra note 5, art. 1D. 
47
 The United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine. On Dec. 11, 1948, the UN Res. 194 initiated 
the UNCCP to mediate between Arabs and Israelis in Arab-Israeli Conflict. 
48
 UN General Assembly, supra note 5, art. 1D. 
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argued that according to the exclusion clause, the presence of one type of rights, 
protection or assistance is enough to have this specific group of refugees cut out of the 
convention and the benefits of the protection mandate of the UNHCR and the 1951 
Refugee Convention. “The shared intention of the Arab and Western states was to deny 
Palestinians access to the Convention-based regime so long as the United Nations 
continues to assist them in their own region.”49 
The exclusion clause has been debated for many years. Many states have used it 
to justify failure of addressing the Palestinian refugee matters to finding a permanent 
solution such as granting asylum, resettlement, and a more full integration into host 
states’ societies. 
 The second half of Article 1D of the 1951 Refugee Convention reads: “When 
such protection or assistance has ceased for any reason, without the position of such 
persons being definitively settled in accordance with the relevant resolutions adopted by 
the General Assembly of the United Nations, these persons shall ipso facto be entitled to 
the benefits of this Convention.”50 The significance of this clause is that under certain 
circumstances it entitles Palestinian refugees to the benefits of the 1951 Refugee 
Convention as well as the UNHCR’s mandate. This clause introduces an exception to the 
exclusion, and is usually referred to as the ‘inclusion clause’. This part of the article 
clearly states that if “protection or assistance has ceased for any reason”51 then the 
mentioned excluded refugee group is ipso facto included in the 1951 Refugee Convention 
and shall benefit from the protection of the UNHCR. 
Similar to the or in the exclusion clause, the inclusion clause has a similar or that 
benefits the Palestinian refugees once read and interpreted in a certain light. The 
‘inclusion clause’ or, entails a direct inclusion of Palestinian refugees generally. 
Especially that the UNCCP, the entity responsible for the Palestinian refugees’ protection 
in preserving their right to redress, has ceased its functions and no longer seek out 
                                                          
49
 JAMES C. HATHAWAY, LAW OF REFUGEE STATUS, 208, (Butterworths, 1991) (1991). 
50
 Id. 
51
 Id. 
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reparations for Palestinian refugees. That being said, and by virtue of the meaning of the 
or in the ‘inclusion clause,’ then the absence of either protection or assistance, makes the 
targeted refugees eligible for the benefits under the UNHCR’s protection umbrella, and 
included in the 1951 Refugee Convention. 
A different approach was taken into consideration when interpreting the 
‘inclusion clause.’ Some interpret it that it only applies to the Palestinian refugees when 
UNRWA activities cease to exist, meaning, when the Palestinian refugees no longer have 
a special agency to address their interests of assistance and aid. While others have 
interpreted the clause by understanding that Palestinian refugees will be included in the 
1951 Refugee Convention and UNHCR’s Mandate when this particular group of refugees 
leaves the area of operations of UNRWA and seek refuge elsewhere, where UNHCR is 
the only refugee specialized entity and UNRWA has no geographical mandate.
52
 
“Palestinian refugees were thus singled out from other refugees in two ways. First, a 
special protection and assistance plan composed of UNCCP, UNRWA and UNHCR was 
established. Which was composed of UNRWA’s mandate to relief Palestinian refugees 
from their displacement and loss of livelihood post their mass exodus in 1948. Second, a 
different and separate analysis based on Article 1D applies in the determination of the 
status of Palestinians as refugees.”53 This is what has been interpreted repeatedly by UN 
bodies as well as host states. 
B. Article 7 (c) UNHCR Statute 
Similar to the 1951 Refugee Convention’s exclusion clause, the UNHCR statute 
includes one under Article 7 (c). The article reads: “Provided that the competence of the 
High Commissioner as defined in paragraph 6 above shall not extend to a person: Who 
continues to receive from other organs or agencies of the United Nations protection or 
assistance.”54 The same analogy applies to the statute of the UNHCR in this article, 
similar to the one made for the 1951 Refugee Convention ‘exclusion clause.’ There is 
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 BADIL Resource Center, Closing Protection Gaps, 2
nd
 Edition, 42 (Feb.2015). 
53
 Id. 
54
 UN General Assembly, Statute of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Dec. 
14, 1950, A/RES/428(V). 
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clear exclusion of the Palestinian refugees who are registered with UNRWA and 
receiving aid from one of UNRWA’s operating locations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
15 
 
IV. Protection Gap Theory 
There are several benefits that are awarded to refugees worldwide. These benefits are 
guaranteed by the 1951 Convention as well as international law, both customary and 
convention based. The refugee benefits and standards of protection are elaborated in the 
1951 Convention, beginning with a “non-discrimination”55 article, all the way up to 
“naturalization”56 opportunities for refugees in host states. The 1951 Refugee Convention 
covers an array of benefits that mainly aim at protecting refugees in host states in 
addition to preserving their human rights.
57
 Having said that, there still is not a clear term 
that defines what protection means to refugees. It is clear to say that at minimum, refugee 
status grants protection from expulsion from host states, when other non-citizens are 
subjected to. 
It is argued that protection is measured by its absence. Hence, if refugees are 
excluded from customary international law benefits, and convention based international 
law, then refugee-hosting states will fall into a protection gap, based on how host states 
understand these articles and the way these articles are being interpreted and practiced in 
reality. Moreover, a protection gap can be revealed by excluding a category of refugees 
for one reason or another from the benefits of the 1951 Refugee Convention, international 
law, as well as international human rights law. 
This chapter aims at defining the protection gap as the distance between the 
benefits actually enjoyed by refugees and a threshold for protection awarded to refugees 
worldwide by virtue of established rules of international law included in binding treaties 
and customary international law. This threshold will entail the right to non-refoulement as 
well as receiving aid and benefits in a right-based approach and not as a privilege. The 
chapter then explains how refugees fall into a protection gap theoretically by discussing 
the ways laws are being interpreted, de jure, as well as examining the practices refugees 
are subjected to in host states, de facto. 
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A. Protection Gap Defined 
1. Non-Refoulement  
Looking at the principle of non-refoulement from a perspective that best serves refugees, 
it is safe to say that it “has attained the normative value of jus cogens.”58 Consequently, 
refugee hosting states cannot derogate from this rule and no reservations can be made or 
permitted on any of the articles that engulf the rule of non-refoulement in any convention 
that embodies it. Non-refoulement is mentioned in a number of contexts that both directly 
and indirectly tackle refugee benefits and assistance. Highlighting some of these contexts 
will elaborate on the importance of having the rule of non-refoulement as the base 
minimum of protection for refugees and the first element of protection threshold 
identified in this paper. 
Treaty law is the first, but not the only, context in which the rule of non-
refoulement is mentioned. For example, the 1951 refugee Convention mentions the rule 
of non-refoulement in its preamble as well as Article 33 Prohibition of Expulsion or 
Return (“refoulement”). The article reads, “no Contracting State shall expel or return 
(“refouler”) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his 
life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, 
membership of a particular social group or political opinion.”59 Non-refoulement is also 
proscribed in United Nations Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, under Article 3
60
 in addition to Article 7 in the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
61
 
The second context, in which the rule of non-refoulement is mentioned, is 
international human right law. The role of human rights law is to protect refugees and 
preserve their rights, not only those who fall into the definition of refugees, but even 
those who do not fall under the scope of the refugee definition in the 1951 Refugee 
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Convention. It is even believed that “human rights law is the primary source of refugee 
protection, while the Geneva Convention is bound to play a complementary and 
secondary role.”62 While refugee law and its executing bodies offer a precise and 
exclusive measure of treatment to refugees, “international human rights law strengthens 
that legal framework by allowing refugees to invoke the protection of norms whose scope 
of application may be wider than those in the refugee regime.”63 One example is the 
prevention of refoulement in situations where there is a genuine threat to refugee lives in 
addition to torture, punishment, and inhumane treatment. Human rights and refugee 
matters are becoming more intertwined whereby human rights law applicability to 
refugees is becoming “complementary protection” to the 1951 Refugee Convention as 
well as refugee law in general. “This development eventually led to the consolidation of 
the principle of non-refoulement and to the conceptualization of refugee protection under 
international human rights law as complementary protection.”64 
The third entity which is considered along with the rule of non-refoulement is the 
UNHCR. The UNHCR is the primary body acting on behalf of the UN to assist in all 
matters relevant to the refugee situation; its status stipulates that the UNHCR is “acting 
under the authority of the General Assembly [and] shall assume the function of providing 
international protection … and of seeking permanent solutions for the problem of 
refugees.”65 In order to fulfill its mandate, the UNHCR requires the cooperation of 
refugee hosting states since one of its core mandates is to request the states’ assistance 
and “compliance with their international obligations towards refugees and asylum-
seekers.”66 The UNHCR’s role can never be fully implemented if signatory parties to the 
1951 Refugee Convention apply non-entry rules to refugees seeking safety in host states. 
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Stemming from this notion states are not free to reject refugees at the frontier and it has 
been argued that this rejection does amount to refoulement.
67
 
Application of the rule of non-refoulement is the first element in guaranteeing 
refugees’ assistance and aid in hosting states, and consequently preserving their right into 
protection. This rule is the first threshold which protection is evident. Hence, it is the first 
indication of a protection gap if absent. 
2. Assistance: rights-based or privilege 
Similar to the rule of non-refoulement, granting refugees aid as a right and not a privilege 
is the second marker of protection to refugees. States and international agencies could 
provide refugees and displaced persons with different forms of assistance but the 
existence of assistance is not per se a marker of protection. This assistance could be, for 
host states, an exercise of sovereign privilege that does not correlate with any 
international law duty towards the recipients of aid. In this case, one can hardly claim that 
refugees and displaced persons are protected, because host states could decide 
unilaterally to suspend aid for moral, humanitarian, or political reasons. Alternatively, 
taking serious guarantees stipulated in binding international human rights instruments, 
refugees and displaced persons could receive assistance as a matter of right that correlates 
with internal law duties on host countries. Only when refugees receive assistance as a 
matter of right that one can plausibly say that they are protected under international law. 
 In this sense, states fall into a protection gap when they deny assistance and aid to 
refugees as a right. States may have a different definition of what assistance and aid could 
mean when hosting refugees. Furthermore, states can place reservations on one or more 
of the protection articles mentioned in the 1951 Refugee Convention.
68
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If refugee-hosting states grant refugees assistance from a privilege approach, then 
states can revoke assistance on any grounds and at any time, leaving refugees vulnerable 
and open to abuse by host states. Due to the fact that refugees’ right to seek aid and 
assistance is not legally binding on host states, this adds to the turmoil of refugees in 
living in fear and under the indirect oppression of the host state. Consequently, if aid is 
not given a legal context and a binding nature then it will not be a right per say and will 
always remain a privilege that entails more difficulties for refugees than solutions. Hence, 
as long as states have a right and not a duty to perform assistance and aid to refugees, 
there is always a possibility both refugees and states may fall into a protection gap. 
B. How do refugees end up in a protection gap? 
There are two ways that refugees might fall into a protection gap: de jure or de facto. 
While the former might be debatable and is controversial due to states’ interpretations of 
customary international law, or the reservations made by some contracting states on 
convention based international law, the latter is rarely questioned, because it entails 
practices subjected on refugees at a ground based level. 
1. De Jure  
International law was initially drawn to correct mistakes that happened in history post 
World War I and II as a form of cleaning up the hazards of war and reducing the pain 
inflicted on civilians of states that had to live through the atrocities of these wars. 
Beginning with the League of Nations,
69
 then its successor, the UN, both entities were 
keen on improving human rights in the world. The UN’s Charter states that it aims at:  
sav[ing] succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our 
lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind, and to reaffirm faith in 
fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the 
equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small, and to establish 
conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties 
and other sources of international law can be maintained.
70
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It is customary that “[a] treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance 
with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the 
light of its object and purpose.”71 Therefore, it is logical to assume that states need to 
interpret these articles as well as abide by them to the best of their abilities, in addition to 
fulfilling their obligations in good faith. Consequently, states can fall into a refugee 
protection gap when they fail to interpret refugee law in a manner that best serves refugee 
interests and their status is restricted due to local laws or the lack of local laws that 
protect the rights granted to refugees by the 1951 Refugee Convention. Thus, it is safe to 
claim that if a state has not adopted local refugee laws, then it should use the 1951 
Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol as the backbone of its related refugee laws as 
well as a method for implementation and treatment of refugees in its state. 
Another aspect of the de jure protection gap is the reaction of some states to the 
1951 Refugee Convention. The reaction varies from placing reservations on some of the 
articles, to redefining some of the terms and provisions to better cater to the host states 
benefits regardless of the “greater good” of providing assistance, aid, and protection to 
refugees. It is clear that reservations to the 1951 Refugee Convention are permitted, 
signatory states are allowed to make reservations on some articles as stated in the 
convention itself. The host states fulfillment of these reservations and their implications 
move refugees from falling into the protection gap from de jure to de facto. 
2. De Facto 
Interpreting the law is as important as the rule of law itself.  This means that the practices 
of some refugee hosting states need to mirror their understanding of the rule of law and 
their abidance by customary international law as well as convention based international 
law. Based on the principles of the 1951 Refugee Convention that aims to serve all 
refugees in an undiscriminatory manner regardless of refugees’ ethnicity, religion, or 
political and social affiliation, and all benefit from the convention principles in a “rights-
based” manner,72 yet this is not the case for all refugee groups. There have been 
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registered incidents of some refugee groups falling in a de facto protection gap by some 
states’ practices exclusively targeting them. 
This exclusion highly depends on how hosting states implement the provisions of 
the 1951 Refugee Convention based on reservations made to the convention and its 
protocol.  For example, the state of Australia made the following reservation regarding 
Article 17 of the 1951 Refugee Convention Wage-Earning Employment
73
 “not as a 
binding obligation, but merely as a recommendation.”74 This reservation mirrors 
Australia’s demeanor in creating job opportunities for refugees as well as hindering the 
process of their socio-economic integration in Australian society.  
Finland, on the other hand, made reservation to Article 24 of the 1951 Refugee 
Convention, stating that; “A reservation to article 24, paragraph 1 (b) and paragraph 3 to 
the effect that they shall not be binding on Finland.
75
 Article 24 tackles matters of Labor 
Legislation and Social Security. In the case of Finland, the state did not believe that 
refugees are entitled to the benefits of social security or labor legislation as Finnish 
citizens. This limitation also puts laboring refugees at risk of exploitation as well as 
without reparation in the event of work injuries or hazards. 
States base their reservations on their understanding of the rule of law as well as 
which articles conflict with their constitution or interests whether for the states 
themselves or at times political interests. While some states might use the excuse of 
security for their reservations and amendments, other states just declare that a certain 
article does not apply to them without any further explanation. For example, the state of 
Israel explicitly made the following reservation on the 1951 Refugee Convention, using 
one simple statement; “Articles 8 and 12 shall not apply to Israel.”76 
Another example of how reservations made by states can affect the de facto 
treatment of refugees is the reservation made by Turkey to the Protocol Relating to the 
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Status of Refugees that states; “according to which it applies the Convention only to 
persons who have become refugees as a result of events occurring in Europe.”77 The 
Turkish reservation indicates that it is has limited its obligation to refugees that are a 
result of a conflict in Europe only. This meaning that entering the Turkish state are not 
going to be granted refugee status in Turkey, or the ability to seek asylum, resettlement, 
or social and economic integration in Turkey, unless they enter from Europe. Yet, Turkey 
has been more than welcoming to refugees escaping the Syrian Civil War both 
Palestinian refugees from Syria as well as the Syrian refugees. Though it has not granted 
them refugee status, it has granted them Temporary Refugee Status
78
 and eased their 
passage on the Syrian/Turkish boarders. 
A more elaborate example of both de jure and de facto refugee protection gap is 
the plight of Palestinian refugees fleeing the Syrian Civil War. This is tackled thoroughly 
in the following chapter. 
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V. Palestinian Refugees from Syria: fitting into the Protection Gap Theory 
In the light of the theory of the protection gap discussed in the previous chapter, this 
chapter aims at shedding further light on the gravity of the protection gap from a de facto 
perspective in the Palestinian refugee context. Currently, Palestinian refugees from Syria 
suffer from discriminatory policies particularly targeted at them by Syria’s neighboring 
states, which are shouldering the burden of refugees post the 2011 Syrian Civil War 
The question of whether there was a protection gap based on de jure examination 
prior to the breakout of the Syrian civil war or not will be answered through examining 
the theory of the protection gap from a scholarly point of view. The debate revolving 
around the existence of the protection gap has been going around long prior to the Syrian 
Civil War. 
The current situation of the Palestinian refugees from Syria in host states varies 
immensely. Jordan, Lebanon, Egypt, and Turkey have all shared in bearing the burden of 
the Syrian civil war refugees’ post 2011. In most cases, these host states varied in their 
level of cooperation, towards the plight of the refugees’ weather Syrian or Palestinian. In 
order to highlight the fact that the Protection Gap is a de facto status for the Palestinian 
refugees from Syria, an examination of the hosting states’ reaction towards their presence 
needs to be highlighted. 
This chapter begins with opinions and arguments of several human rights scholars 
and state their arguments and opinions on the concept of Palestinian refugees falling into 
a protection gap. The chapter also discusses the situation of Palestinian refugees in Syria 
prior to the breakout of the Syrian civil war in 2011 and how Palestinian refugees lived in 
Syria, and what their rights and duties were towards the Syrian society and government. 
The chapter will clarify the situation Palestinian refugees are in since the beginning of the 
Syrian civil war in 2011, both in Syria as well as Host states. This chapter also includes 
host states’ practices in favor of / or against Palestinian refugees whom are facing their 
second or third forced displacement. Some host states’ reaction to Palestinian refugees 
from Syria mirror the protection gap Palestinian refugees are currently subjected to. 
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These host state practices will be discussed by examining the rule of non-refoulement, the 
clarity of the discrimitory policies against Palestinian refugees from Syria, and the denial 
of refugee status to Palestinian refugees in particular in some of the host states. Finally, 
the chapter concludes by weighing the importance of granting Palestinian refugees 
Temporary Protection Status and its benefits to both host states as well as the refugees. 
A. Is there a Protection Gap for Palestinian Refugees? 
There are many voices that argue the concept of the “protection gap.” Not all believe in 
its existence while others are strong defenders of the concept and blame the Palestinian 
refugees’ turmoil on its existence, in addition to demanding redress for Palestinian 
refugees. 
One of the strong voices in claiming the presence of the protection gap theory is 
Susan Akram. She believes that the “protection gap” is evident in the Palestinian refugee 
situation in every aspect of their lives and is present everywhere they reside; “[from] 
basic human and refugee rights to the search for durable solutions.”79 Akram argues that 
Palestinian refugee matters have been handed to UNRWA where it has become the “face 
of the plight.”80 Unfortunately, this representation is weak in nature and limited in 
resources, simply because its protection ability is “virtually nonexistent.”81 Akram 
elaborates on the dimensions of the “protection gap” beyond UNRWA’s incapability to 
claim redress for the Palestinian refugees. In countries outside UNRWA mandate, the 
Palestinian refugee status is even more vulnerable because of the “political 
marginalization, general lack of knowledge in the specifics of the Palestinian refugee 
case, and lack of the PLO
82
 involvement in protecting individual rights of 
Palestinians.”83This means that the situation of Palestinian refugees in Diaspora is 
handled on a case-by-case base. This has resulted in instability for the Palestinian 
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refugee, and left these refugees at the mercy of each state’s interpretation of the 1951 
Refugee Convention. Yet, according to Akram, the most grievous repercussions of the 
“protection gap” are seen in Middle East countries that are under UNRWA’s mandate. 
“Arab states … grant Palestinians very few benefits as a matter of right; whatever 
benefits they might grant are best understood as privileges for Palestinians – and thus 
revocable at any time for any reason.”84  
These practices have placed the Palestinian refugees at the mercy of the Arab 
states’ varying levels of cooperation and understanding of the Palestinian predicament; in 
most cases, obstacles of a political nature confront this cooperation, and security claims 
made against their benefit. These practices have resulted in the hindering of the 
opportunities for Palestinian refugees to function and survive in these host states. In most 
Arab host states such as Lebanon and Egypt, for example, Palestinian refugees are denied 
work, freedom of movement, and family reunification. Akram explains that all durable 
solutions for Palestinian refugees will never see the light of day owing to the reason that 
there is no protection mandate that covers the Palestinian refugees. Accordingly, the 
solution revolves around amending this gap through encompassing the Palestinian 
Refugees into the 1951 Refugee Convention as well as UNHCR’s mandate. 
Jaber Suleiman also believes that the protection gap is present and evident in the 
case of Palestinian refugees. The gap’s existence is a result of a number of reasons all 
revolving around the failure of UN entities to successfully address the Palestinian 
problem. Suleiman pins the blame on UNCCP, UNRWA, as well as UNHCR for their 
complete failure in attempts to compensate refugees as well as reach a durable solution, 
for their lack of protection mandate, and for their irrational exclusion of Palestinian 
refugees from their mandate in the case of the UNHCR. Ergo, the solution for Suleiman 
mainly lies in the UN as an international entity that must be held responsible for 
amending the situation of Palestinian refugees. “[T]he collapse of the UNCCP protection, 
limited protection provided by UNRWA, and inadequate and limited protection afforded 
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by UNHCR resulted in serious protection gaps for Palestinian refugees with respect to 
systematic protection of day-to-day rights and the search for durable solutions.”85 
Reem Salahi on the other hand, relates the protection gap to the failure of UN 
bodies to sanctify protection as a right for Palestinian refugees. It is notable that she 
addresses these entities “in good faith” and states “while Palestinian Refugees originally 
had a special regime that provided both protection through the UNCCP and assistance 
through UNRWA, they currently receive only the most basic assistance and short-term 
protection. Presently, the lack of formalized measures ensures that the approximately 7.5 
million Palestinian refugees strewn throughout the Arab world will never have any form 
of resolution.”86 Salahi refers to the ad hoc and mediocre protection provided by the 
UNRWA as “passive protection”87 in the sense that this protection was limited to 
increasing the number of international staff dedicated to protecting the Palestinians from 
Israeli authorities during the first intifada in 1988 and with little tangible effect. 
Additionally, the nature of UNRWA’s mandate, even though it has expanded throughout 
the years, is still somewhat restricted in terms of protection which leads to the absence of 
a durable solution. Salahi concludes that “even with UNRWA’s attempts to step up and 
provide passive protection, it has failed to fill the protection gap that has resulted with the 
incapacitation of the UNCCP.”88 
Neil Gabiam is among the voices that agree with Akram. He argues that the 
Palestinian refugee rights can be discussed from a human rights perspective in the sense 
that they are “negotiable”89 and “amendable”90 to encompass Palestinian refugee rights in 
their work-frame, which can bridge the gap between the rule of law and what is really 
practiced. 
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Contradicting these voices, are those who do not believe in the concept of a 
protection gap. One of these voices is B. Scott Custer, UNRWA’s former Head of the 
International Law division. He affirms the fact that even if the UNRWA mandate does 
not specifically mention the term “protection” it has managed to do so, out of its own 
sense of responsibility and out of the United Nations General Assembly’s  
recommendations to improve the Palestinian refugees situation and ease their plight. 
Custer expresses his notions regarding the extensive use of the rhetorical term “protection 
gap” as follows: “protection gap is outdated, as UNRWA’s protection has grown since 
the 1980s and, while established without one, it now has an explicit protection 
mandate.”91 
Michael Kagan sides with Custer in that argument and expresses that UNRWA 
has achieved its full capacity and fulfilled their mandates as best as they could. 
“UNRWA made the strongest possible case for protection of the Palestinian refugees. 
That is probable the most that a UN agency can do.”92 Kagan argues that the concept of 
protection is over ambitious at times, and beyond the capacity of UN bodies to handle. 
He leans towards the need for a more elaborate understanding of what proper protection 
for the Palestinian refugees might look like in order to address the matter of Palestinian 
refugee protection in a more feasible manner. Additionally, Kagan points out that the UN, 
as an entity, also has limited power and capacity in the Middle East. Thus, Kagan sides 
with the notion that there is no “protection gap” for Palestinian refugees and that the 
designated entities that are responsible for handling the situation are functioning to their 
fullest capacity. 
These opinions on the protection gap theory are of substantive prominence, 
mainly because current international propositions and solutions dedicated to the 
Palestinian refugees have neither allowed redress nor coped with the refugees’ current 
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situation. In fact, they have aided in prolonging their dilemma. Therefore, the present 
mandates are in need of amendment. 
In my opinion the concept of a protection gap exists in laws and is echoed in the 
practices of international entities that address Palestinian refugees’ matters. Mimicking 
Akram’s opinion, a valid solution for the protection gap could lie in better interpreting 
UNHCCR’s mandate, especially Article 1D that is used for excluding the Palestinian 
refugees from its mandate. In addition, Suleiman connects the protection gap to the 
failure of UN bodies to act in full support for and capacity to benefit Palestinian refugees. 
This notion is also correct relating to the fact that if UNRWA’s mandate was amended to 
engulf protection clauses that would benefit the Palestinian refugees in the long run, it 
would eventually lead to a permanent solution and redress. Moreover, a protection gap 
exists in the Palestinian refugee context due to manner in which assistance and aid is 
granted to this particular group within UNRWA mandate. It is apparent that UNRWA 
provides only basic aid to Palestinian refugees, such as food, health care, and education 
and nothing else. They are merely given enough sustenance to stay alive, yet with no 
hope of maintaining a livelihood or growth. This is evident in Salahi’s argument where 
she labels UNRWA’s protection as “passive,”93 and prolonging the problem instead of 
finding redress for it. The Palestinian refugee rights can also be addressed from a human 
rights perspective. Hence there is a strong stand for amendments that would result in a 
better set of laws that would do justice to the Palestinian refugees’ plight. This notion is 
rationalized by Gabiam’s argument; where he too believes that there is hope for a change 
in the set of laws that would improve Palestinian refugee’s situation if these laws were 
amended as well as reinterpreted in a different light all together. 
In conclusion, the concept of a protection gap is quite evident in the Palestinian 
refugee situation. This gap can be pinned on the laws that tackle Palestinian refugee 
matters directly, which are mirrored vies-a-vies the practices Palestinians are subjected to 
in reality. This leads us to the arguments of those who do not believe in the existence of a 
protection gap in the first place. Custer feels that the term protection is overused and 
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“outdated”94 and that UNRWA is doing its job to its fullest capacity. This is similar to 
Kagan’s opinion regarding the protection the UNRWA can provide to Palestinian 
refugees within its mandate and capacity. Either way, the protection gap does exist if not 
by law, than in practice. In addition, in order for the practices to become more attentive 
towards Palestinian refugee needs, these laws eventually need modification. Thus for 
Palestinian refugees, tackling the protection gap concept from both a de jure and a de 
facto perspectives is essential for reaching a more permanent solution. 
B. Palestinian Refugees in Syria Prior to 2011 
Arguably, both Syria and Jordan are the only Arab states that have granted Palestinian 
refugees citizen-like rights and have helped them to establish a relatively stable and 
normal life. It is over 63 years since the first waves of Palestinians left Mandate Palestine 
in 1948 and sought refuge in Syria as well as other Arab states. Syria has been more than 
forthcoming in its support for the Palestinian refugees’ fragile situation as well as its 
position on the state of Israel and the Palestinian’s right to return. Syria eased the 
Palestinian refugees’ integration into Syrian society and aided them in making a stable 
life in Syria away from Palestine. 
Prior to the civil war outbreak in Syria in 2011, approximately 526,744
95
 
Palestinian refugees were registered with the UNRWA in Syria and living in nine refugee 
camps.
96
 The Syrian government treated the Palestinian refugees “favorably, relative to 
its Arab neighbors.”97 The Palestinian refugees had a stable life in the refugee camps in 
Syria; their socio-economic integration with the Syrian nationals was not a difficult one; 
“together with Jordan, Syria afforded the greatest amount of civil, economic, social, and 
cultural rights to their Palestinian refugee population.”98 Palestinian refugees residing in 
Syria had equal access to healthcare, education, and the job market, in equal opportunities 
as the Syrian nationals did. The Syrian government had initiated attempts to administrate 
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the Palestinian refugee affairs and did not leave matters up to UNRWA alone, the Syrian 
General Authority for Palestinian Arab Refugees [hereinafter GAPAR] was responsible 
for managing the refugee camps, and aimed at both, maintaining connection to 
UNRWA’s activities, as well as keeping the political actors of the Palestinian Front in 
check.
99
 
 Initially, at the time of the Palestinian refugees’ arrival in 1948, Syria was “under 
populated, and many economists saw the new arrivals as an asset for development.”100 
This meant that Syria was not threatened by the arrival of the Palestinian refugees. 
Therefore, and due to its demographic, social and economic circumstances, it began to 
foster new laws that tackled matters concerning the Palestinian refugees residing in Syria, 
in order to make the best of their presence as well as to ensure their rights while 
maintaining their Palestinian identity.
101
 These laws finally integrated Palestinian 
refugees into Syrian law giving them “virtually equal footing with Syrian nationals.”102 
Hence, Palestinian refugees in Syria were able to act as Syrian citizens by law and by 
practice, with a few exceptions on land ownership and buying second homes in addition 
to citizenship and the right to vote.
103
 Other than these, the Palestinian refugee population 
in Syria was fully integrated into the Syrian one. 
C. Palestinian Refugees in Syria Post 2011 
Palestinian refugees residing in Syria have been seriously affected by the outbreak of the 
Syrian civil war in 2011. Feuding groups attacked Palestinian refugees and many refugee 
camps all over Syria turning some into battle zones. According to UNRWA’s facts and 
figures covered in the Syrian Crisis, a total of 343,000 Palestinian refugees from Syria 
have been directly affected since the outbreak of the civil war.
104
 About 180,000 
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Palestinian refugees have been internally displaced,
105
 whereas 44,000 refugees are 
located in Lebanon, 15,000 in Jordan, and 4000 in Egypt as for Turkey, the number is 
still uncertain.
106
 While these numbers may or may not increase, the Palestinian refugees 
from Syria are facing harsher living conditions by days whether inside Syria or in the 
previously mentioned host countries with the exception of perhaps Turkey as the chapter 
will clarify shortly. 
The neutrality of the Palestinian refugees in Syria was not taken into 
consideration and they have been forcibly dragged into a fight that did not concern them. 
One of the most notable attacks on Palestinian refugee camps was the attack on the 
Latakia refugee camp by Bashar Al-Assad’s forces, whereby “gunships, tanks, and 
armored vehicles forced more than 5000 Palestinians to flee from the camp.”107 The news 
travelled fast with the international press highlighting the gravity of attacking the neutral, 
unprotected, and aid-reliant refugees.
108
 This reflected negatively on the Syrian 
government. Filippo Grandi, UNRWA Commissioner General at the time, affirmed the 
dire necessity of keeping Palestinian refugees out of the struggle and respecting their 
status as refugees in Syria. Hence, he “publicly appealed to Palestinian refugees in Syria 
to remain neutral and called upon all parties to respect their neutrality.”109 
 Another attack that targeted the Yarmouk refugee camp in Damascus caused 
even more casualties and damage. On December 16
th
, 2012, a Syrian jet was responsible 
for killing tens of civilians,
110
 and causing a reduction of the refugee camp population 
from “160,000 refugees to about 30,000 inhabitants.”111 This airstrike on Al-Yarmouk 
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refugee camp among other targeted attacks have resulted in “its destruction, the death of 
hundreds, and the displacement of 95% of its inhabitants.”112 
As matters have escalated in Syria and fighting has become a more serious threat 
to Palestinian refugees, it has become a dire necessity out of self-preservation for them to 
seek refuge in neighboring countries like, Jordan, Lebanon, Egypt, and Turkey. Each of 
these host states have had to deal with Syrian nationals whom have also now become 
refugees and seeking protection from the war. Therefore, the host states have had to deal 
with both refugee groups pursuing safety from the war in Syria. 
1. Palestinian refugees in Lebanon 
Lebanon’s legislation hinders accepting more Palestinian refugees than it already hosts 
since Lebanon is already home to almost 500,000
113
 Palestinian refugees. Palestinian 
refugees escaping the war in Syria face hardships on entering Lebanon. Since August 8, 
2013, Human Rights Watch has repeatedly reported that the Lebanese borders 
deliberately deny Palestinian refugees entry into Lebanon.
114
 Since this Human Rights 
Watch report, there were a few policy changes regarding Palestinian refugees.  While 
these changes in favor of the Palestinian refugees did not last long another Human Rights 
Watch report accentuated the denial of entry to Palestinian refugees from Syria in another 
report May, 2014.
115
 
Gebran Bassil, Lebanon’s Foreign Minister, has clearly stated the Lebanese 
principles behind the governmental restrictions on the flow of refugees from Syria to 
Lebanon: 
When we say we do not want the displaced Syrians and Palestinians to take our 
place, this needs to be backed up by action. They are taking the place of the 
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Lebanese by their mere presence, work and life here […]. This comes out of our 
sense of nationality and not on racist bases. The emigration from our land must 
stop. Our youth is leaving and our place shouldn’t be given to others… I am not 
saying that we need to close boarders. Our borders should be for exporting goods 
abroad and for protecting ourselves and our country, Lebanon from all that is bad 
and contraband. This is the reason for having boarders, not as an avenue for 
strange and evil ideas to enter and eat us from the inside.
116
 
As of August 2013, the Lebanese government instituted new regulations allowing 
entrance to Palestinian refugees: 
a valid pre-approved visa which required an application made by a guarantor in 
Lebanon; a valid visa and ticket to a third country – meaning they were only 
transiting through Lebanon; a scheduled medical or embassy appointment; or if 
they were able to prove they had family already legally in Lebanon (a family 
member had to send a valid copy of their residency permit to the authorities as 
proof).
117
 
The fluctuation in Lebanon’s stance on granting entrance to Palestinian refugees 
from Syria has manifested itself in continuous hardships for the Palestinians seeking 
safety in Lebanon. This eventually has led to many entering Lebanon illegally, or by 
using false documentation rendering the Palestinian refugees “without a clear legal status 
in the country and at risk of arrest, and deportation.”118 
Moreover, Lebanon used the “no-camp” policy to discourage Palestinian refugees 
fleeing from Syria from entering Lebanon. This policy “has led to a crisis in the 
availability of shelter, and in desperate choices of settlement areas, such as the already 
overcrowded pre-existing Palestinian refugee camps.”119 
Beginning in May 2014 the Lebanese government had another change in policies 
that regulated Palestinian refugees’ entrance from Syria. Harsher conditions were 
implemented which have resulted in a decrease in the number of Palestinian refugees 
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flow to Lebanon. The new regulations require them to present at least an entry permit 
approved by the General Security, a one-year or three-year residency visa, an exit and 
return permit, and/ or a valid ticket to a third country, “in which case they can get a 24-
hour transit permit.”120 As a result, between 15 April and 31 May 2014, the number of 
Palestinian refugees from Syria grew by only 73, a significant decrease compared to the 
previous six weeks.
121
 
2. Palestinian refugees in Jordan 
Records from UNRWA show that Palestinian refugees fled from Syria to Jordan as early 
as March 2012.
122
 “As of 29 October 2013, 9,657 Palestinian refugees from Syria had 
taken refuge in Jordan.”123 These refugees managed to successfully register with the 
UNRWA offices in Jordan. Later in 2012, the Jordanian government decided to seek 
other means of protection for Palestinian refugees from Syria without the need for 
admitting them to its lands. Jordan’s Prime Minister Abdullah Ensour explained that 
Palestinian refugees were refugees only in Syria, and that Jordan was not a place for 
resettlement even in the light of the Syrian civil war. He explained why in an interview: 
There are those who want to exempt Israel from their repercussions of displacing 
the Palestinians from their homes. Jordan is not a place to solve Israel’s problems. 
Jordan has made a clear and explicit sovereign decision not to allow the crossing 
to Jordan by our Palestinian brothers who hold Syrian documents. Receiving 
those brothers is a red line because that would be a prelude to another wave of 
displacement, which is what the Israeli government wants. Our Palestinian 
brothers have the right to go back to their country of origin. They should stay in 
Syria until the end of the crisis.
124
 
Stemming from that notion, Jordan considered developing a buffer zone, on the 
Syrian border to offer the Palestinian refugees shelter without permitting them to 
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formally enter the country.
125
 The rationale behind Jordan’s actions was that the 
Palestinian refugees from Syria would cause a “dangerous precedent”126 as the 
government feared the possibility of their mass exodus to Jordan.
127
 In the end, 
Palestinian refugees were not admitted to a buffer zone because Jordan did not go 
through with the plan; instead, it “detained Palestinians who have entered Jordan through 
unofficial crossings without the possibility for release, except to Syria.”128  
As an alternative to the buffer zone, Jordan detained refugees in Cyber City;
129
 
this secluded Cyber City is remote and underdeveloped part of the city of Ramtha, and 
has little to offer Palestinian refugees from Syria. UNRWA is only able to provide the 
necessities to Palestinian refugees in Cyber City due to its remoteness and its strict 
supervision by the Jordanian government. Simultaneously, Palestinian refugees are not 
permitted to leave Cyber City “not allowed to move beyond 30 meters of the camp.”130 
Moreover, Jordan has compulsorily turned away Palestinian refugees from 
Syria,
131
 discriminated against family members in entering Jordan based on their official 
documents, and even deported some members of families on the same basis.
132
 This has 
rendered the Palestinian refugees from Syria even more helpless and vulnerable. They are 
either detained or forced to return to Syria where their refugee camps have been 
destroyed. In despair, Palestinian refugees often return to Syria where their livelihoods 
are compromised and their lives threatened. 
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3. Palestinian refugees in Egypt 
As of March 2015, there are 4,000 Palestinian refugees from Syria in Egypt.
133
 These 
refugees should be ipso facto included in the UNHCR’s mandate since they are not 
present in an area of UNRWA operations, according to the second part of Article 1D of 
the 1951 Refugee Convention, which Egypt is a signatory party to.
134
 This fact entitles all 
refugees entering Egypt to be included in the UNHCR’s mandate as per Article 7 (c) of 
the UNHCR’s mandate as well as Article 1D of the 1951 Refugee Convention. In spite of 
the state’s ratification of the 1951 Convention, Egypt has banned UNHCR from 
registering the Palestinian refugees from Syria. This move is in clear violation of 
UNHCR’s mandate as well as Article 1D of the Refugee Convention.135 The government 
asserts that the Palestinian refugees are not eligible for the protection of the UNHCR in 
Egypt.
136
 The denial of Palestinian refugees right to be registered with an international 
entity that guarantees their rights as refugees and supplies refugee protection to them 
leaves them unprotected and vulnerable to all kinds of abuses. 
 Egypt has also orchestrated a set of regulations that inherently limit the arrival of 
the Palestinian refugees from Syria in particular. “Palestinians must arrive directly from 
Damascus to Egypt's Cairo airport.”137 Due to the closure of the airport in Damascus, this 
regulation makes the task of arriving to Cairo via Damascus airport impossible. As an 
alternative, Palestinian refugees from Syria have tried flying to Cairo either from Turkish 
or Lebanese airports. Since this is not accepted by the Egyptian government Palestinian 
refugees from Syria end up being detained in the Cairo airport compelled to return to 
Syria or end up in limbo status between Egyptian, Lebanese, and Turkish airports. 
Furthermore, Human Rights Watch has frequently reported that the Egyptian government 
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has practiced arbitrary detention of Palestinian Refugees from Syria: “Egypt has detained 
over 1,500 refugees from Syria, including at least 400 Palestinians and 250 children as 
young as two months old for weeks and sometimes months. Security officials have 
acknowledged that the refugees will be held indefinitely until they leave the country.”138 
Since the Human Rights Watch report in 2013 Egypt has not amended its 
restrictive laws against Palestinian refugees from Syria and continues to maintain a tight 
grip on them. Human Rights Watch asserted this fact in its 2015 World Report on Egypt: 
Egypt violated the rights of refugees, [and] asylum seekers, within its borders. 
Egypt prevented the UNHCR from registering Palestinians from Syria, and 
security officials maintained a restrictive visa and security clearance requirement 
enacted following the ouster of Morsy. In some instances authorities coerced 
refugees from Syria to leave to Lebanon, without assurances they would be 
protected there, and to Syria, where they face persecution, detention, and 
violence.
139
 
Additionally, many Palestinian refugees from Syria consider Egypt as a transit 
stop to Europe. The main aim for many individuals is to cross the Mediterranean Sea and 
land in Europe where they can then seek asylum. “Egypt for them was a temporary stage 
before they reach Europe through the Mediterranean Sea on what became known as 
Death Boats.”140 
4. Palestinian refugees in Turkey 
Turkey became an option for Palestinian refugees from Syria seeking asylum in August 
2011 when the Latakia refugee camp was bombed by Assad forces.
141
  It has been 
reported that since April 2015, there are between10,000 to 15,000 Palestinian refugees 
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from Syria in Turkey and Europe.
142
The Turkish government does not discriminate 
against the refugees fleeing the civil war in Syria. Both Syrian nationals as well as 
Palestinian refugees from Syria have been granted safe entrance. “Turkey’s current policy 
is to grant Temporary Protection, rather than refugee status, to all persons fleeing the 
situation in Syria.”143 
Since 2011, each of the states that boarder Syria has been equally affected by the 
plight of the Syrian civil war. Every state has faced these difficulties and challenges 
differently, and each has dealt with the Palestinian refugees from Syria via a different 
mechanism. In practice the Palestinian refugees from Syria are the most vulnerable group 
affected by this lack of conformity. Only Turkey is still an option for Palestinian refugees 
from Syria. All other hosting countries have decided to turn away Palestinian refugees. 
“Since mid-2014 Turkey is the only one of the surrounding countries that will still allow 
entry to Palestinian refugees from Syria.”144 
D. Protection Gap Highlighted 
The lack of protection for the Palestinian refugees as they try to cross from troubled 
warzone areas across Syria to a safe state has labeled them as a vulnerable group and 
subjected them to a variety of host states’ laws that are not applied to any other group of 
refugees. Palestinian refugees from Syria are forced to accept callous treatment by some 
host states. Simultaneously, and due to the lack of the international community’s 
assistance and authoritarian oversight, this particular refugee group have found 
themselves being displaced for the second or third time around since the 1948 war and 
with nowhere to go. 
Refoulement is the first evidence of the existence of the protection gap the 
Palestinian refugees from Syria face as they attempt to seek safety in host states. While 
non-refoulement is a jus cogens rule in International Law. States such as Jordan, 
                                                          
142
 Palestinian Return Centre, Action Group for Palestinians of Syria, and Filistin Dayanışma Derneği 
(FİDDER), Report on the Conditions of Palestinian Refugees in Syria, 27. 
143
 Bidinger, supra note 119, at 104. 
144
 Roger Zetter and Héloïse Ruaudel, Development and Protection Challenges of the Syrian Refugee Crisis, 
47 FORCED MIGRATION REVIEW 6, 9 (2014). 
39 
 
Lebanon, as well as Egypt do not abide by it and ignore it when dealing with Palestinian 
refugees fleeing Syria. The term jus cogens means that all states, even those whom are 
not a signatory party of the 1951 Refugee Convention, are obliged to abide by it under 
the umbrella of customary international law. As mentioned by the 1951 Refugee 
Convention, non-refoulement is one of the principles in which the convention is based, as 
well as affirming that non-refoulement is embedded in customary international law.
145
 In 
addition to the 1951 Refugee Convention Article 33 asserts the prohibition of expulsion 
or return (“refoulement.”)146 The article also reads that the principle applies to refugees 
whose “life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, 
membership of a particular social group or political opinion.”147 Hence, the action of 
turning back Palestinian refugees from Syria from any border does in fact threaten their 
lives due to their political stands, original country of descent, or nationality. 
In the case of Jordan, it is evident that it has breached customary international law 
in turning away Palestinian refugees from Syria. In the Jordanian context, Prime Minister 
Abdullah Ensour explained the Jordanian government’s ideology behind Jordan’s barring 
of the Palestinian refugees fleeing from Syria, in particular, as previously examined, even 
to those who possess Syrian documents. Though Jordan is not a signatory party to the 
1951 Refugee Convention or its protocols, it is still obliged to admit Palestinian refugees 
fleeing the war in Syria. It can be argued that due to demographic concerns as well as 
political ones, Jordan took this stand against the presence of a new wave of Palestinian 
refugees in its state. To many, Jordan acts as an alternative homeland to about 2,097,338 
registered Palestine refugees.
148
 Jordan has relentlessly rejected this ideology and acted 
against its realization. 
Nonetheless, the Jordanian practice of non-entry to the Palestinian refugees is 
breach of the principle of non-refoulement.
149
 Human Rights Watch has repeatedly 
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reported the non-entry policies practiced by the Jordanian government on its borders, 
“there have even been documented cases of refoulement from Jordan. UNRWA has 
repeatedly urged Jordan to allow PRS [Palestinian refugees from Syria] across the 
border.”150 
In the case of Lebanon, the resentment towards the presence of refugees is 
noticeable and is equally mirrored in harsh practices and rules that address Palestinian 
refugee matters directly. The conditions under which Palestinian refugees from Syria are 
placed under are quite impossible at times. Similar to Jordan, Lebanon is not a signatory 
party of the 1951 Refugee Convention, yet is still obliged by customary international law 
to grant Palestinian refugees from Syria entrance under the principle of non-refoulement. 
It has been documented that UNRWA has tried to assist and promote the entrance of 
Palestinian Refugees from the Syrian-Lebanese border. “UNRWA border officials not 
only monitor the numbers of border-crossers, but also intervene and advocate on behalf 
of individual refugees when border officials engage in discriminatory or unlawful 
treatment.”151 
Lebanon is faced with an abundance of issues when it comes to accepting the 
current mass influx of refugees. It is a relatively small country that has been struggling 
with events that shape its current ideology towards refugees. First, Lebanon has d 
resources; the shortage in water supply and electricity has always been a challenge for 
Lebanese citizens. Hence, when the population residing in Lebanon increase by millions 
in a short time, the government is incapable of accommodating these needs on an 
emergency basis and in practically has had no time whatsoever to prepare for them. 
Second, Lebanon is fearful of the demographic changes it is undergoing since the 
beginning of the Syrian civil war. The number of refugees is in constantly increasing. 
Finally, UN acting bodies in Lebanon, mainly UNHCR and UNRWA that are the main 
financial facilitators to refugees from Syria are underfunded. Both agencies have pleaded 
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with UN and other International entities to increase supply aid and assistance to the 
refugees in order to meet the bare minimum of their needs.
152
 
 Egypt has also shared this policy of not granting Palestinian refugees from Syria 
entrance. Though Egypt is a signatory party to the 1951 Refugee Convention, it has 
refused to grant Palestinian refugees from Syria entrance. Since non-refoulement is 
clearly stated in the 1951 Refugee Convention as well a UNHCR’s mandate. Egypt is in 
clear breach of the both conventions as well as customary international law.  
Second, Jordan, Lebanon, and Egypt are using clear discriminatory policies 
towards Palestinian refugees from Syria as they attempt to enter any of the host states.   
All borders discriminate against the entrance of the Palestinian refugees from Syria based 
on their identification papers. Consequently, all three states are in breach of the 
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 
(ICCPR), which all three states are signatory parties to. Syria’s neighboring states have 
been selective in granting entrance to refugees. Syrian refugees are granted safe passage 
to the host countries while Palestinian refugees from Syria are not. 
Third, Denial of refugee status to the Palestinian refugees as they leave Syria and 
enter host states renders Palestinian refugees from Syria unprotected. This leads them to 
lose all their rights under customary international law and human rights law. This line of 
thought and practice is emulated in both the Jordanian logic,
153
 as well as the Egyptian 
one.  
The clear and firm actions of the Jordanian government mirrors Jordan’s 
understanding that the Palestinian refugees from Syria are only refugees within the 
borders of Syria, and do not enjoy the same status when they are forced out of the 
troubled country. The Jordanian logic is flawed in many respects. They mix Israel’s 
occupation of Palestinian lands in 1948 with the Syrian civil war. The former is not the 
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cause of the latter or connected to it, and vice versa. In addition to that, Palestinian 
refugees from Syria are a recognized group of refugees by international law as well as 
other international entities. Hence, even if they leave their place of residence they should 
still enjoy refugee status wherever they are; denying them their rightful status is a breach 
in itself. Jordan’s detention of Palestinian refugees in Cyber City154 is a breach of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
155
 This would not have been the 
case if Jordan had respected its obligations under customary international law. 
In the Egyptian context, Egypt has refused to allow Palestinian refugees from 
Syria to register with the UNHCR on the same Jordanian grounds. “The Egyptian 
government’s prohibition of UNHCR registration and RSD156 has resulted in a failure on 
the government’s part to extend Convention refugee protection to Palestinians from 
Syria.”157 
Palestinian refugees from Syria are not recognized as refugees within Egypt. “The 
[Government of Egypt] GoE recognizes Palestinians merely as visitors or tourists—not 
refugees.”158 Yet, since Egypt is not an area of UNRWA operations, Palestinian refugees 
are ipso facto included in the UNHCR’s mandate based on Article 7 (c) as well as Article 
1D of the 1951 Refugee Convention. “Because Egypt does not allow for Palestinians to 
receive refugee status, [Palestinian refugees from Syria] PRS have no access to UNHCR 
yellow cards. Without a yellow card, PRS cannot receive a residency permit from the 
government, which places PRS in a particularly susceptible position for arrest and 
removal”159  
Egypt’s discriminatory practices against the Palestinian refugees from Syria deny 
them their rights under refugee law and human rights law. Yet, even if Egypt denies 
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recognition of the refugee status of the Palestinian refugees from Syria, Egypt still shares 
an obligation under human rights law to assist and aid this group both, Palestinian 
refugees generally and those fleeing from Syria in particular. 
All the previously mentioned proves the presence of a protection gap in the 
Palestinian refugees from Syria context. The international law breaches committed 
against Palestinian refugees from Syria would not be present if the protection gap did not 
actually exist. Mirroring the practices exercised against Palestinian refugees from Syria; 
it is evident that there is no level of protection for this particular group in the first place. 
Hence, all actions against them are somewhat justifiable in the eyes of Jordan, Lebanon, 
and Egypt, which were highlighted by the Syrian Civil war.  
Attempting to remedy the situation for Palestinian refugees from Syria is a 
possibility if the international bodies as well as host states had a more committed 
demeanor towards solving the Palestinian refugees’ dilemma. First, this is true if 
UNRWA had in its capacity and mandate to enforce protection awarded to Palestinian 
refugees by host governments. Second, present a clear interpretation of article 1D of the 
1951 Refugee Convention that enables Palestinian refugees from benefiting from the 
convention. Third, if an independent, international, mechanism was created to oversee the 
treatment of Palestinian refugees from Syria in host states. And finally, and most 
importantly, if host states granted Palestinian refugees from Syria “temporary protection 
status” to ensure their protection until the war is over in Syria and get settled back in 
Syria or elsewhere, the situation would be remedied. 
E. Temporary Protection 
The concept of Temporary Protection Status [hereinafter TPS] is an international law 
norm, and one that is evidently needed at times when there is no other solution for 
refugees present. This offers the most minimal form of protection at times of necessity. 
“Under temporary protection the persons or groups benefit fewer rights relative to 
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Convention refugees.”160 TPS guarantees open borders to refugees which affirms the 
right to non-refoulement, and guarantees preserving human rights law when tackling 
matters of concern to the refugees, as well as the guarantee that once the original habitual 
place of the refugee group becomes a safe zone, the refugees will be able to go back to 
their original states of residency and resume their lives without burdening the host states. 
Awarding Palestinian refugees TPS will present benefits to the Palestinian 
refugees and deliver guarantees to the host states that their responsibilities would not be 
permanent; first, and as the name implies the status of this protection is temporary in 
nature, yet, it still entails providing protection to refugees whom do not enjoy the right of 
protection. Contrary to the concept of protection in the 1951 Refugee Convention as well 
as the Mandate of the UNHCR, both entities as well as the host states are obligated to 
cooperate with one another and search for a durable solution and/or resettlement options 
and integration. The concept of TPS does not grant all protection rights to refugees. 
However, it does play an essential role in preserving their rights in many ways as well as 
keeping safeguarding them after fleeing areas of conflict. 
Granting Palestinian refugees from Syria a TPS will allow them to enter hosting 
states safely and not be in danger of refoulement. The aim is to preserve Palestinian 
refugee lives and not return them to the war zone in Syria. The benefits are numerous: 
However labeled, the concept of temporary refuge/temporary protection as the 
practical consequence of non-refoulement through time provides, first, the 
necessary theoretical nexus between the admission of refugees and the attainment 
of a lasting solution. It establishes, a priori, no hierarchy in the field of solutions, 
but allows a pragmatic, flexible, yet principled approach to the idiosyncrasies of 
each situation. So, for example, it does not rule out the eventual local integration 
or third country resettlement of all or a proportion of a mass influx in the State of 
first refuge, acting in concert with others and pursuant to principles of 
international solidarity and equitable burden-sharing. Secondly, the concept 
provides a platform upon which to build principles of protection for refugees 
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pending a durable solution, whereby minimum rights and standards of treatment 
may be secure.
161
 
Second, granting Palestinian refugees fleeing from Syria TPS is a form of 
fulfilling the humanitarian aspect of state liability to refugees. Under human rights law, 
there is a liability of protecting refugees and assisting them when a host state is capable 
of doing so, “human rights law is the primary source of refugee protection, while the 
Geneva Convention is bound to play a complementary and secondary role.”162 In this 
case, host state responsibility, although not binding in nature, proves that states are 
welcoming to the refugee groups as well as living up to its obligations under customary 
international law. 
Third, accepting Palestinian refugees from Syria as refugees with TPS will relieve 
the host states from the burden of resettling a mass influx of refugees, as well as 
processing thousands of asylum seekers into their systems. Hence, this lightens a burden 
of resettlement, in granting asylum, as well as assisting in relocating them for a durable 
solution. This option is not available to Palestinian refugees anywhere, except in the 
context of the Turkish Government’s actions. 
It is only in Turkey where Palestinian refugees from Syria share with the Syrian 
nationals the right in ‘Temporary Protection Status’ which grants them a limited number 
of rights, yet sufficient enough to ensure their safety in Turkey. Within the Temporary 
Protection Status, all refugees are welcomed at the Turkish border without 
discrimination. They are also granted a safe stay in Turkey until matters in Syria are 
resolved. “Palestinians ex-Syria undergo the exact registration process that is afforded to 
Syrians, and are not subject to discriminatory treatment.”163 
Finally, the norm TPS indicates that this form of protection is transitory and not 
permanent. Consequently, Palestinian refugees from Syria are not to stay in any of the 
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host states indefinitely. As soon as the civil war subsides in Syria, Palestinian refugees 
will return back to their original habitual state, and thus relieving host states of any social 
or economic responsibility. 
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VI. Conclusion 
Refugees are a vulnerable group by default and are left without internal protection due to 
a “well-founded fear of being persecuted”164 which has resulted due to their lack of 
diplomatic protection by countries of their origin or habitual residence. The alarming 
number of refugees indicate that conflict zones in the world are becoming a serious threat 
to the international security, which has lead to the attention international law has given 
this matter through customary and treaty-based international law. 
Furthermore, as soon as refugees seek asylum and protection in host states they 
are put at the mercy of signatory parties’ fulfillment of the 1951 Refugee Convention, its 
1967 Protocol, as well as UNHCR that acts on behalf of refugees worldwide. While there 
is no clear understanding of a protection gap in international law, it is logical to assume 
that protection is measured by its absence; hence, the absence of certain protection 
measures granted to refugees highlights a gap both refugees and host states fall into. 
Among the many groups of refugees worldwide, Palestinian refugees residing in 
the Middle East are the most protracted refugee problem. For over 67 years the 
Palestinian refugees in the Middle East have been marginalized, since their dilemma is of 
a political nature at core, and little has been offered to them. Aid awarded to Palestinian 
refugees only includes day-to-day life sustenance and short-term solutions to the longest 
refugee problem in the Middle East. The Palestinian refugees are the largest group of 
refugees to be described by international law based on their; “criterion of ethnic or 
territorial origin, coupled with a stipulation that the applicant not enjoy de jure national 
protection.”165 
This paper aimed at addressing the concept of a protection gap that Palestinian 
refugees from Syria have fallen under since the outbreak of the Syrian Civil War in 2011. 
Moreover, the paper argues that UNRWA practices are insufficient to reach a durable 
solution for Palestinian refugees in the Middle East. The evidence is based on events 
                                                          
164
 UN General Assembly, supra note 5, Article 3. 
165
 HATHAWAY, supra note 49, at 4. 
48 
 
happening post the Syrian civil war in 2011 and prior to the civil war in revising the 
Works and Relief Program offered by the UNRWA to Palestinian refugees from Syria. 
In order to understand the tangled situation Palestinian refugees are in, it was 
necessary to examine Palestinian refugees’ relationship to the UN and its executing 
bodies that tackle Palestinian refugee matters on a first-hand basis. Some might argue that 
the reason behind its presence is UN itself. Both UNCCP and UNRWA have contributed 
one way or the other in Palestinian refugee lives. UNRWA’s mandate revolves around 
granting Palestinians day-to-day assistance and aid. But, UNRWA’s mandate does not 
define protection. UNRWA also lacks providing Palestinian refugees with protection 
measures necessary to secure a more stable situation or a durable solution. What 
UNRWA offers is only a form of “relief protection:”166 
[Palestinian refugees] currently receive only the most basic assistance and short-
term protection. Presently, the lack of formalized protection measures ensures that 
the approximately 7.5 million Palestinian refugees strewn throughout the Arab 
world will never have any form of resolution. This has created, and threatens to 
continue creating, a perpetuation of multiple forced displacements for refugees.
167
 
It is also important to discuss the relationship between Palestinian refugees and 
international law. This is manifested in both article 1D of the 1951 refugee Convention 
and article 7 (C) of UNHCR Statute. Both articles exclude Palestinian refugees from 
benefiting from the protection awarded by the convention and UNHCR. Article 1D of the 
1951 Refugee Convention has an exclusion clause that targets Palestinian refugees, in 
particular, since they are the only refugee group in the world with a UN dedicated agency 
to provide assistance, aid, and works program. Similar to Article 1D, Article 7(c) of the 
UNHCR statute also discusses how Palestinian refugees are excluded from the protection 
of the UNHCR on the same basis: Palestinian refugees receive aid from another entity, 
and hence do not fall under the UNHCR mandate. In addition, the presence of UNRWA 
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as an agency acting on behalf of Palestinian refugees is limited in nature and not 
sufficient to grant Palestinian refugees the protection they lack. Palestinian refugees are 
privileged to have a UN entity that is solely dedicated to their cause even if the 
Palestinian plight was a result of the UN itself. 
Defining the Protection Gap theory helps create the threshold of protection 
awarded to refugees is necessary protection for refugees who fall into a protection gap. 
Hence, for the intents and purposes of this paper the bare minimum of protection granted 
to refugees entails their right in non-refoulement as well as conceptualizing that aid 
presented to them is more than a privilege but a right. These two concepts are the essence 
of protection awarded to refugees; hence their absence amounts to a protection gap for 
any group of refugees and not just the Palestinian refugees exclusively who suffer from 
it. 
In order to shed more light on the discussion of the concept of protection gap, the 
theory was tackled from two perspectives de jure and de facto. Both are necessary to 
elaborate on the protection gap theory. While the presence of a protection gap from a de 
jure standpoint can be debated as it is exclusively dependent on the rule of law and its 
interpretations that stipulate the measures of treatment to refugees as well as their rights 
under international refugee law, international law, as well as human right law. Covering 
the protection gap theory from a de facto viewpoint is not as debatable, since treatment of 
refugees in host states is visible and defiantly acts as proof of the presence of a protection 
gap for refugees. 
In order to further highlight the protection gap theory, and answer whether there 
was a protection gap prior to the dilemma of Palestinian refugees from Syria in 2011, two 
aspects are examined. The first aspect is, examining the scholarly debate revolving 
around the protection gap theory for Palestinian refugees in general. This debate is 
extensive. These many are strong believers and supporters of the presence of a gap and 
call for amendments into the laws that hinder granting Palestinian refugees’ protection in 
particular. Others negate the presence of a protection gap for Palestinian refugees and 
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countered that the assistance and aid presented to them is exactly what is stipulated in 
UNRWA mandate and in accordance with UN’s policy 
The second is the situation of Palestinian refugees in Syria prior to the civil war. 
The Palestinian refugees residing in Syria were granted Syrian citizen-like rights. They 
were allowed home ownership; they were granted access to education as well as 
healthcare, and were granted equal employment opportunities equal to Syrian nationals. 
Perhaps only Jordan has granted Palestinian refugees similar rights. Yet, the socio-
economic integration of the Palestinian refugees was more evident in Syria than in 
Jordan, and defiantly more welcomed by the state as well as the citizens of Syria than in 
Jordan. 
Since the Syrian civil war, about one-third of the Syrian population has been 
forced to leave their homes.
168
 This has created a large scale exodus of refugees and 
asylum seekers in the Middle East and the world. Syria’s neighbors as well as the 
international community currently shoulder the burden of these refugees; 680,000 of this 
new wave of refugees are Palestinian refugees that took refuge in Syria post the 1948 
Arab-Israeli war.
169
 The treatment the Palestinian refugees from Syria have received, by 
host states, mounted to international law breaches and caused refugee-hosting states to 
fall into a protection gap. Henceforth, Palestinian refugees from Syria fall into a de facto 
protection gap. This is evident in examining the host states’ attitudes and reaction 
towards the Palestinian refugees. The respective states of Jordan, Lebanon, Egypt, and 
Turkey react differently to the mass influx of Palestinian refugees. 
First, Jordan denied entrance to Palestinian refugees from Syria, and in further 
attempts to control the number of the Palestinian refugees from Syria, Jordan created a 
Cyber City to detain Palestinian refugees rather than host them in refugee camps that 
were dedicated to the Syrian refugees or locate them in the already existing Palestinian 
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refugee camps in Jordan. Moreover, Jordan denied Palestinian refugees their refugee 
status outside Syria, and called for their staying in Syria until the conflict in Palestine has 
ended and they can return to their original home. This is hostile position that threatens 
Palestinian refugees’ life and was vividly voiced by Jordan’s Prime Minister Mr. Ensour. 
Lebanon, on the other hand, denied Palestinian refugees from Syria access to 
Lebanon based on their documentation, a clear form of discrimination and a violation of 
Palestinian refugee rights. Moreover, Lebanon initially created several harsh regulations 
to grant Palestinian refugees entrance. These regulations led to illegal attempts to cross 
the Lebanese boarders, as well as a noticeable decrease in the numbers of Palestinian 
refugees seeking asylum in Lebanon. As for those who were granted a safe passage to 
Lebanon, they were subjected to harsh living conditions in the already over populated 
Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon. 
Egypt created punitive and somewhat impossible conditions for allowing 
Palestinian refugees from Syria entrance to Egypt. Also, the Egyptian government denied 
refugee status to Palestinian refugees from Syria, hence hindering the process of their 
registration with the UNHCR in Egypt. Moreover, Egypt has detained many Palestinian 
refugees seeking safety in Egypt. Among the detainees, children were reported to be in 
lockdown with their families with nowhere else to go but back to Syria. 
Turkey, on the other hand, is the only state that has treated the mass influx of 
refugees equally both Syrian and Palestinian. Although it does not recognize refugees 
from outside Europe, it granted Temporary Refugee Status to both refugee groups. 
Based on this analysis, it is clear that all of the states affected by the Syrian civil 
war with the exception of Turkey have committed the following international law 
violations against the Palestinian refugees from Syria;  refoulement, discriminatory 
policies, as well as denial of refugee status. 
Stemming from this notion, the proposal of granting Palestinian refugees from 
Syria Temporary Protection Status would ensure their protection as well as ensure that 
host states would not shoulder the burden of these refugees for an extended period of 
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time. As the name implies, Temporary Protection Status is short-term in nature. Host 
states will not fall into a protection gap by fulfilling the rules of customary international 
law. Even more so, host states will be relieved of the burden of resettling the Palestinian 
refugees from Syria or having to ensure their social as well as economic integration in 
these hosting states. Temporary protection is to some extend a quick remedy to a messy 
situation, as Fitzpatrick explains: 
Temporary protection is like a magic gift, assuming the desired form of its 
enthusiasts’ policy objectives. Simultaneously, it serves as a magic mirror of its 
observers’ fears. For refugee advocates, TP [temporary protection] expands the 
protection of forced migrants who cannot satisfy the criteria under the 1951 
Convention and it promises group-based protection when the determination of an 
individual’s status proves impossible. At the same time, refugee rights 
organizations fear that informal and discretionary TP may dislodge refugee 
protection from the realm of enforceable human rights.
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The nature of UNRWA’s assistance is limited to health care, education, economic 
assistance, as well as the micro-financing of small projects to Palestinian refugees. 
“UNRWA’s intermittent attempts to fill this gap have been stymied by the acknowledged 
limitation of its mandate and strong Israeli opposition to any expansion of its role.”171 
These reasons add to the limitations of UNRWA in the sense that it is not only limited by 
its mandate; it is also limited by political pressure from the state of Israel. This all 
indicates the presence of a protection gap for Palestinian refugees. 
In conclusion, protection for refugees entails many rights, the most important of 
which are granting asylum, resettlement possibilities, and full social and economic 
integration. Other protection measures include international law norm non-refoulement 
and temporary protection status. In totality, these rights are essentially denied to the 
Palestinian refugees because there is not a clear protection mandate that includes 
Palestinian refugees and the interpretation of the existing laws hinder associating 
Palestinian refugees with other refugee groups in the world. 
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